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Abstract
Lorentz covariance imposed upon a quantum logic of local propo-
sitions for which all observers can consistently maintain state collapse
descriptions, implies a condition on space-like separated propositions
that if imposed on generally commuting ones would lead to the cov-
ering law, and hence to a hilbert-space model for the logic. Such a
generalization can be argued if state preparation can be conditioned
to space-like separated events using EPR-type correlations. This sug-
gests that the covering law is related to space-time structure, though a
final understanding of it, through a self-consistency requirement, will
probably require quantum space-time.
1 Introduction
The origin of hilbert-space quantum theory has been a nagging question ever
since its creation. Axiomatic approaches, by which one attempts to derive
the hilbert-space formalism from postulates whose content is supposed to be
clear and whose truth is supposed to be compelling, have only had limited
success. Even if progressive clarity has been achieved, the truth of the axioms
never seems compelling. Something is missing, and the formalism continues
to mystify. We shall here attempt to dispel part of this mystery by arguing
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that space-time considerations provide motivation for adopting some of the
axioms that are hard to justify otherwise.
Though there are many axiomatizations of hilbert-space quantum me-
chanics, we shall here focus on one, the well-known and much investigated
Piron’s [1]“quantum logic”. The main object of consideration is a complete
atomic orthomodular lattice of “physical propositions”. To have a general-
ized hilbert-space model one has to assume, among others, an axiom called
the “covering law.” It is this law that has received considerable attention,
being the most controversial of the ingredients.
There are many attempts to reduce the covering law to clearer and
more compelling physical statements, generally by introducing further struc-
tures into the quantum logic, such as measurements, transition probabilities,
propensities, etc. We show here that some such structures provide us with
means of deriving necessary conditions on the quantum logic if it is to de-
scribe a Lorentz-covariant theory. Generalizations of such conditions are
then seen to be sufficient to derive the covering law and thereby a Piron-type
hilbert-space model.
There are three main ingredients in our argument. The first is the ex-
istence of Heisenberg-like physical states that suffer “collapse”-type trans-
formations upon measurements. The second is Lorentz covariance, which,
beyond the usual group-action type formulation, includes also what we call
“covariance of objectivity” (Postulates 11 and 12) of section 6. These state
roughly that if a state is prepared by a measuring apparatus with space-like
separated parts then it has the usual covariance properties with respect to
local observables in regions that are future time-like to all the parts of the
measuring apparatus. An immediate consequence of this assumption is a
condition on space-like separated propositions which, if applied to any com-
muting ones, would imply the covering law in existing axiomatic schemes.
This suggests that the whole covering law may have a space-time origin. To
reach such a conclusion however, one has to somehow relate time-like and
space-like situations, which leads to the third major ingredient, that there
are sufficiently many states with EPR-type correlations to be able to prepare
arbitrary states conditioned to space-like separated events, as is the case for
ordinary relativistic quantum mechanics.
Our approach is also of an axiomatic character, and so too suffers from
the shortcomings we attribute to all such attempts. To its merit, it does
clarify the nature of the final physical basis behind quantum mechanics. In
particular, the third assumption suggests that a final justification could only
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come through some form of generalized quantum gravity where the light cone
is not a fundamental but an emergent and object.
We have already argued for a space-time origin of the quantum formalism
(Svetlichny [2]). There we use the hypothesis that it is impossible to com-
municate superluminally (ISC). Now the use of ISC to deduce constraints
on physical theories must be considered at best heuristic, for ISC must be
traceable to more basic considerations. In fact, in theories such as quan-
tum gravity, where the light cone is an emergent object, ISC itself must be
emergent. It is thus imperative that we try to re-establish the putative con-
nection between hilbert space and lorentzian space-time in a way that makes
no appeal to signals. To this end we must set up some of the machinery of
what could be called relativistic quantum logic, quantum logic subject to the
requirements of special relativity.
Relativistic quantum logic is relatively new, about two decades old. The
paper of Mittelstaedt [3] could be said to be one of the first pioneering works
published on the subject. The formalism was applied to the analysis of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment by Mittelstaedt [4] and by Mittelstaedt
and Stachow [5]. The approach is based on the dialogical (dialog logic) view
of physical propositions upon which relativistic restrictions are applied in
the form of spatio-temporal validity regions. The work of Neumann and
Werner [6] is an elaboration of Ludwig’s [7] measurement axiomatics. A
causality postulate is introduced for systems prepared in a space-time region
and recorded in a space-like separated region. Examples are presented but no
consequences are derived. The author’s own first ideas were also developing
around the same time, but in contrast to the above mentioned works were
inspired mainly by local algebraic quantum field theory introduced originally
by Haag and Kastler (see Haag [8]). It is this viewpoint that we follow in
this paper. One should also mention the work of Mugur-Scha¨chter [9, 10]
which though not explicitly “relativistic” is undeniably spatio-temporal and
thus related.
Though the idea of relativistic quantum logic is not new, the application
that we have in mind, to seek a space-time basis for the covering law, is
new. It seems that to do so, we must incorporate structures that go beyond
the usual ortho-algebraic ones. As a guide we try to adhere as much as
possible to notions current within the usual “Copenhagen” interpretation
and accepted by the greater part of the physics community. In doing so, we
do not advocate this interpretation nor claim that it is in some sense correct,
only that it provides a set of principles that are sufficiently characteristic of
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quantum mechanics to be an interesting and familiar starting point.
We thus assume the usual notion of ensemble. Ensembles of physical sys-
tems give rise to representational elements in some abstract set of “physical
states”, which for conventional quantum mechanics is the set of density matri-
ces , positive hilbert space trace-class operators of trace one. Ensembles may
consist of subensembles in which case these form well defined fractions given
by a real number in [0, 1]. Ensembles and subensembles are to be consid-
ered as potential ontological entities capable of partial realization. Generally
ensembles are partially realized by repetition of preparation procedures and
subensembles identified by the occurrence of some physical results during
preparation. The subensemble fraction is assumed to be approximated by
the frequency of occurrence of the corresponding result. Besides ensembles of
physical systems we can consider ensembles of measurements or experiments.
These are partially realized by carrying out the corresponding acts a large
number of times in such a way that they do not interfere with each other
nor are interfered with by other acts and events in the universe. For this to
make sense one must assume that one can individuate the necessary physical
systems and the experimental apparatus in a way that warrants neglect of
external influences, and posit some type of relativity theory by which act
performed in different regions of space-time may be considered as perform-
ing the same experiment. Also for each one of these experiments it is usual
to use a mathematical model in which the corresponding experiment is the
only thing existing in all of space-time. This is a deliberate idealization of
the isolation of the experiment from external influences. We shall tacitly
subscribe to all such usual idealizations and conventions which underlie an
“ensemble” interpretation of a physical theory.
In the recently introduced “consistent histories” approach to quantum
mechanics [11, 12], many of the usual assumptions about “physical states”
become considerably weakened, especially concerning the “collapse” of the
state due to measurements. A relativistic quantum logic based on a consis-
tent histories viewpoint would proceed in a radically different direction, and
at first sight would not lead to the same conclusions, and so provide no justi-
fication for the covering law. We have suggested elsewhere [13] that quantum
gravity would renormalize any such theory to one in which the covering law
holds, as this would be a fixed point in a self-consistency requirement, how-
ever the argument used is still rather sketchy, and so will not be considered
here, except for a few remarks toward the end. Based on this however, we
feel that the present “collapse-biased” considerations are pertinent to a final
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explanation and must be taken into account.
We must call attention to the distinction between ultimate physical facts
and physical descriptions. Physical facts include at least such uncontrover-
sial happenings as counter clicks, collisions, supernovas, etc., about which all
observers agree. Descriptions are formal tools needed to deal with facts. The
distinction is not at all clear-cut for one generally tries to include among the
facts inferred objects such as the earth’s interior, and these may be argued
by others to be just descriptive constructs that coordinate the true uncon-
troversial facts. One may maintain that elementary particles are just formal
objects we have invented to provide a more visualizable description of the
surprisingly complex and subtle antics of macroscopic bodies. In Feynman-
Wheeler electrodynamics there are no electromagnetic fields, only charged
bodies interacting along light-like intervals. If such a theory is taken as true,
then the usual electromagnetic fields become just remote and formal descrip-
tive paraphrases of the facts. A physical theory must make some declarations
as to what is factual and what is descriptive, it must make some “ontolog-
ical” commitment, though part of one category may slide over to the other
as one changes the postulated relation of the descriptive elements to what
are considered ultimate facts. Our concern in this paper is with classes of
theories in which certain descriptions can be consistently maintained regard-
less of their relation to true ultimate facts. Descriptions belong to observers
and are often frame-dependent. Ultimate facts are self-subsisting and have
nothing to do with frames. All observers must agree upon them. Relativistic
theories relate ultimate facts placing them in equivalence classes under the
action of an appropriate relativity group. Frame-dependent descriptions and
group action must coexist. This places constraints on the possible theories.
It is some of these constraints that we try to explicit.
Our exposition, though roughly of an axiomatic nature, will gloss over
mathematical details of purely technical type so as not to overburden the
principal conceptual structure, whose presentation is the aim of this paper.
We do not claim that we’ve found compelling reasons for quantum mechanics
to be the way it is. We do claim that we’ve found a set of physical assumptions
that can guide a more physically motivated axiomatics. That such a set of
assumptions exists is worthy of note even if some of them can be seriously
questioned in isolation. Our results must be considered in any attempt at
unification of space-time with quantum mechanics.
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2 Projection Rule and Objective Mixtures
Let a quantum state be represented by a density matrix ρ and perform
an ideal measurement represented by a self-adjoint operator A, which for
simplicity’s sake we assume has a discrete spectrum. Thus A =
∑
λPλ,
where the sum is over distinct eigenvalues λ, and the Pλ are spectral pro-
jectors. The projection rule states that outcome λ occurs with frequency
Tr(ρPλ) and if this not zero, then the state after the measurement is given
by ρλ = PλρPλ/Tr(ρPλ). We have here a “beam-splitter” interpretation of
the measurement: the resulting states ρλ for different values of λ are main-
tained separate either formally (by conditioning further measurements or
even data analysis to particular outcomes of the current one), or even physi-
cally by guiding the resultant states into different spatially separated regions.
One can however disregard which outcome occurs and consider each instance
of any of the post-measurement states as being an instance of a single state
which would now be represented by ρA =
∑
λTr(ρPλ)ρλ =
∑
λ PλρPλ. This
is usually referred to as an “incoherent mixture” of the resulting states ρλ.
One cannot reverse this, just from the density matrix ρA, there is no way
of determining the constituent components ρλ and the corresponding fre-
quencies Tr(ρPλ). Even if we seek pure components, a non-extreme density
matrix ρ can be decomposed in an infinite number of ways into a convex
combination of extreme matrices, that is, there are infinitely many Borel
probability measures µ with support in the subset P of extreme points such
that ρ =
∫
p dµ(p). This of course raises a much ventilated controversy: given
a non-extreme density matrix ρ, is any among its infinite integral represen-
tations as a convex combination of extreme points somehow better, or even
objectively or ontologically “correct”? If some principle is assumed by which
a unique representation is singled out, we shall call this representation an
objective mixture, and to distinguish it from a purely mathematical integral
representation, we shall use an indexed equality sign =o for the former. Thus
ρ =o
∫
p dµ(p) means that it is this representation that is singled out by the
postulated principle. We use the term “objective” to give a deliberate bias to
the notion, as we envisage that such unique representations have their roots
in some objective reality. In particular, prior measurements may provide a
basis for such representations.
One often sees another type of pure-to-mixed state transformation, the
partial trace. For any density matrix ρ defined in a tensor product hilbert
space H1 ⊗ H2 one can define the partial trace ρ
(1) = TrH2ρ, a density ma-
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trix in H1, defined by requiring that for any bounded operator A in H1 one
has Tr(ρ(1)A) = Tr(ρ(A ⊗ IH2)). In general even if ρ is a pure state, the
partial trace ρ
(1)
ψ is not. What is usually said about this last situation is
that ρ
(1)
ψ represents an ensemble of first members, in an undetermined state,
of a pure ensemble of a two-member composite system. Thus if we write
ψ =
∑
i αi⊗βi where αi ∈ H1 and βi ∈ H2 then one can conceive ψ as repre-
senting a composite system with two components, the states of one of which
are represented in H1 and of the other in H2. If one now makes a measure-
ment represented by the self adjoint operator A only on the first component,
the expected value is Tr(ρ
(1)
ψ A) and so as far as the measurements on the first
component are concerned, the system acts as though the first component is
in a mixed stated given by ρ
(1)
ψ . The conventional wisdom concerning this
situation is however that this is always a mathematical description and no
objective mixture ρ
(1)
ψ of any kind is present (except for the very particular
case of the partial trace being extreme). The “partial trace” state is con-
sidered to be ontologically different from the other types of ensembles. The
prototypical example of this situation is the singlet state of a two photon
system. If no measurement is made on one of the photons, then the other
one, in so far as it could be construed as a separate entity, is considered to
be “unpolarized”, that is, in no definite state of polarization. In fact, if any
polarizer is placed in front of it, the probability is always one half that it
will pass through. One must point out that to be “unpolarized” is not a
possible state that a photon may be in, as any one-photon state is always in
some state of polarization. Thus to talk about an “unpolarized” photon is
to employ a (useful) metaphor concerning the presence of an entangled state
involving several photons.
A rather strong principle that leads to objective mixtures could be called
“primacy of pure states”: given a mixed state, then any given physical in-
stance of such a state is in fact a physical instance of a unique pure state
which possibly varies from instance to instance. Primacy is given to pure
states and mixed states arise through mere ensemble mixtures and do not
represent new irreducible ontological entities. This is usually the attitude
upheld in elementary textbooks on quantum mechanics especially for sys-
tems comprised of a small number of particles, as one can easily prepare
mixtures that prima facie seem to obey it. One could seriously question it
for mesoscopic and larger systems. We have argued (Svetlichny [14, 15]) that
its negation can and does lead to interesting possibilities as there are combi-
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natorial hidden-variable models in which mixed states violate this principle,
opening up a new approach to the distinction between the classical and the
quantum. A explicit revocation of the primacy of pure states can be found
in Czachor’s [16] proposals for non-linear quantum mechanics, in which den-
sity matrix evolution is not reducible to evolution of its component mixtures,
the non-uniqueness of which is behind the causality problems of non-linear
deformations of quantum theory. We shall see below that the principle can-
not be universally upheld along with special relativity and usual notions of
causality. Nevertheless, its simplicity makes it a useful heuristic device and
it does bear examination on two grounds: 1) it becomes relevant once one
contemplates alternative physical theories, and 2) it’s a useful starting point
for seeking weaker criteria for objective mixtures.
Under the primacy of pure states, if ρ =o
∫
p dµ(p) and A an observ-
able whose expected value in a pure state p is <A>p then the expected
value <A>ρ in state ρ has to be
∫
<A>p dµ(p). For a conventional quan-
tum mechanical observable represented by a self adjoint operator A one has
<A>p= Tr(pA) and then <A>ρ=
∫
Tr(pA) dµ(p) = Tr ((
∫
p dµ(p))A) =
Tr(ρA) by the linearity of the trace and the operator A. The representation
as an objective mixture drops out and any other representation would lead
to the same observable consequences. Operationally, there is no observable
difference between two different representations, and some maintain that ob-
jective reality is related to the density matrix itself and representations as
convex combinations of pure states is a purely mathematical affair. If however
one wants to depart from ordinary linear quantum mechanics, the question of
representation of mixtures becomes crucial as the integral formula for <A>ρ
could very well depend on the representation used in which case some form
of objective mixtures has to be maintained. Furthermore, maintaining some
such version does lead to very interesting and important consequences as
one is then able to influence “objective reality” at a location space-like to
one’s own through EPR-type long-range quantum correlations. Consider the
singlet state of a two-photon system when the two photons are space-like
separated and, say, traveling along opposite arms of an EPR-type apparatus.
If we now perform an observation represented by a non-degenerate quan-
tum observable A with normalized eigenvectors ψ1 and ψ2 on one arm of
the apparatus, then by the projection postulate and strict correlations in
the singlet state, the state on the other arm immediately after the measure-
ment is an equal mixture of ψ1 and ψ2 represented by the density matrix
1
2
I = 1
2
(ψ1, ·)ψ1 +
1
2
(ψ2, ·)ψ2. Now, if we believe in objective mixtures and
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rewrite this with =o, we see that by changing the observable A to one with
a different eigenbasis, we immediately change the objective mixture on the
other arm. This “action at a distance” upon supposed objective mixtures
has been extensively discussed ever since the original EPR paper (Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen, [17]) and has recently been used to derive a series of
strong constraints on possible alternatives conventional quantum mechanics
(Gisin [18, 19, 20, 21]; Pearle [22, 23]; Svetlichny [2]). Such constraints stem
from the fact that if one is not careful, such alternative theories will allow for
humanly controlled superluminal signals and hence supposed difficulties with
special relativity. We shall henceforth refer to these results as the ISC con-
straints. Theories in which objective mixtures as the result of measurement
are allowed descriptive elements are strongly constrained and so it behooves
us to try to give this notion some solid foundation.
Let us therefore assume that states collapse by measurements to objective
mixtures and see what this may mean. Consider again a source of singlet
two-photon states which then travel in opposing arms of an EPR-type ap-
paratus. Assume we are in a reference frame, the rest frame, in which the
apparatus and the source is at rest so that the two correlated photons are
always at equal distances along the two arms. Put a vertically oriented linear
polarizer at some distance along one arm, call it arm 1 and mark the other
arm, call it arm 2 , at the same distance without first placing anything in
the way of the photon. By the usual arguments we must now conclude that
just beyond the mark one has an objective mixture of vertically and horizon-
tally polarized photons in equal proportions. We shall also consider a frame,
the moving frame, in which a photon on arm 2 reaches the mark before its
mate reaches the linear polarizer. In this frame, just beyond the mark, the
photons are still unpolarized and an objective mixture of linearly polarized
photons comes into being further down the arm. Thus the objective mixture
description is frame dependent. In itself, frame dependence is not a defect
and we face it all the time. A static magnetic field, viewed from a moving
frame, becomes a magnetic and an electric field, so the presence or absence
of an electric field is frame dependent. However, this type of behavior is
easily explained by the notion of covariance under a group representation
while the frame dependence of objective mixtures is of a completely different
nature. Try now to give meaning to the statement that in the rest frame, just
after the mark, there is an objective mixture of vertically and horizontally
polarized photons. At first glance one might say that each photon would
pass with certainty either through a vertically or horizontally oriented linear
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polarizer and that this is not true for any other “filters” that can be placed
in its path (uniqueness of objective mixtures). Let us call this the passage
criterion. Note that in this situation the criterion is counterfactual for we
have no way of knowing which polarization any individual photon has, but
if we did know, it would pass through an appropriately oriented polarizer.
Now call upon Maxwell’s demon’s cousin, the quantum demon. This being
has knowledge of quantum mechanical systems that cannot be achieved by
any humanly constructed apparatus, in our case the knowledge missing in
the counterfactual criterion. Place now a linear polarizer just after the mark
and have the quantum demon rotate it through a sequence of horizontal and
vertical orientations in such a manner as to pass all the photons from the
objective mixture that impinges upon it. How does this situation look from
the moving frame? In this case the demon is twirling his polarizer in front
of unpolarized photons and even so he is capable of letting all of them pass
through. What’s responsible for this strange fact? We can of course try
to blame the linear polarizer that sits at arm 1 but the event of a photon
impinging there is to the future of its mate impinging upon the demon’s
polarizer. This looks like inverted causal order, but it’s inverted order at
space-like separation and so could be deemed innocuous (though there is
the danger that concatenating two such could lead to time-like retrograde
causality). Also it’s not surprising that such inverted causal order appears,
as we have already posited something like “action at a distance” for manipu-
lating distant objective mixtures and a Lorentz transformation can turn this
into action into the past. What is often desired of theories that show such
apparent causal anomalies (such as tachyon theories) is that the causal or-
der of events can be reinterpreted as again to follow a strict temporal order.
This would make the notion of cause and effect frame dependent, but in the
end the usual notions of causality can be maintained in any frame. Let us
call this desideratum upon physical theories “strict temporal causality”. If
we assume this then we cannot blame the polarizer on arm 1 and we must
assume that even a beam of unpolarized photons is an objective mixture of
vertically and horizontally polarized photons. However we can restart the
whole argument now with a circular polarizer on arm 1 and conclude that
a beam of unpolarized photons is an objective mixture of left and right cir-
cularly polarized photons. Similarly for any other type of polarizer. This
contradicts the whole idea of objective mixtures as uniqueness is important,
and we must state that the conjunction of special relativity, strict temporal
causality, and the counterfactual passage criterion for objective mixtures is
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contradictory. Note however that primacy of pure states implies the pas-
sage criterion (counterfactual or not) and so the notion of primacy must be
abandoned as a universal principle if we want to keep the other two. One
way to weaken the passage criterion (or the primacy of pure states) is to
abandon the uniqueness requirement. This is not a desirable step for us as
this would undermine the ISC constraints. However such a step does bring
its insights. We would then admit that an unpolarized photon already has
a well defined value for any of its possible polarizations. We are now faced
with a hidden-variable theory where each relevant quantum observable has
a well defined value. We know that any such theory to be successful must
be contextual and non-local (Redhead [24]). It is the appearance of non-
locality in this context that is indicative. Primacy of pure states and the
passage criterion seem at first to be local in nature, however let us examine
them from an operational point of view. Confronted with a given physical
instance of a mixed state we call upon our quantum demon to tell us which
particular instance of a pure state, represented by a normalized vector ψ, we
are dealing with. How can we be sure that the demon tells the truth? We
test the state with the question represented by the hermitian projector Pψ
upon the one-dimensional space spanned by ψ. If the test fails, the demon
lied, if it passes we’re still not sure but this is the best we can do. If after
a very long run all tests pass, we have strong statistical evidence to believe
the demon is truthful. Now comes the crux of the matter: in any relativistic
field theory, Pψ is not a local observable. We shall treat this some paragraphs
below, but given this, we see that the notion of objective mixtures cannot be
operationally a local notion, and it is the contradictory attempts to treat it
as such that leads to major difficulties.
On the other hand, in the rest frame, the photons just beyond the mark
seem to behave exactly like an objective mixture of linearly polarized photons
because if we place a linear polarizer in a horizontal orientation just beyond
the mark, we get exact coincidence with what happens at the other polarizer.
In the moving frame the roles of the arms are reversed to maintain strict
temporal causality but the same description applies. Another argument for
objective mixtures is that we can reproduce the quantum demon’s exploit if
we delay the photon on arm 2 sufficiently. At some point before the mark
on arm 2 place a mirror that reflects the photon to a second distant mirror
which then reflects it back to the arm at a position further down the arm
from the first mirror but still before the mark, and at this position place a
third mirror that redirects the photon again outward along the arm. Let the
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distant mirror be so removed that information about what happened at the
polarizer at arm 1 has time to reach an observer stationed at the mark before
the detoured photon reaches him. The observer then uses this information to
rotate a linear polarizer just beyond the mark so as to allow all the photons
to pass through. Of course now the event of the photon passing through the
polarizer on arm 2 is inside the future light cone of the event of its mate
passing through the polarizer on arm 1 and this then remains true in all
frames and we cannot invoke the argument presented above which knocked
down the counterfactual passage criterion. So it seems we have all reason to
believe in objective mixtures in this situation. In fact, the passage criterion
is now factual and shows indeed that one deals with an objective mixture
of linearly polarized photons. What happens then as the photon takes its
detour. Does its ontological status changes from unpolarized to polarized
somewhere along its path? If so, when does this happen? If we give a
negative answer to the first question then the photons have been polarized
all along including at points of space-like separation and by our previous
argument we fall back into a particular hidden variable theory which we are
trying to avoid, so the answer must be positive. A natural answer then to the
second question would be that the change happens when the photon reaches
a point along its path that is light-like to the event of its mate encountering
the polarizer at arm 1 . But now this means that a fundamental quantum
mechanical feature changes merely due to a spatio-temporal arrangement.
At space-like separation, given our bias for strict temporal causality, we can
never maintain the (counterfactual) passage criterion of objective mixtures,
but as soon as it becomes light-like, the passage criterion is applicable (and
factual) and shows that one has an objective mixture of linearly polarized
photons. This in itself demonstrates that quantum mechanics is linked to
space-time structure for the photon becomes polarized just by penetrating a
certain light cone. In other words, besides the measuring apparatus, space-
time itself participates in state collapse.
This is in stark contrast with Galileian covariant theories. In such theories
the primacy of pure states can be maintained universally and hence the
passage criterion for objective mixtures can be used in all circumstances.
Now we must look again at the original space-like situation. We saw we
cannot use the counterfactual passage criterion yet we would like to main-
tain some version of objective mixtures. The answer that offers itself is
that whereas for time-like situations objective mixtures are ultimate physi-
cal facts, for space-like separations they are physical descriptions. By this
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we do not mean they are arbitrary or “unreal” but that the criteria for their
choice can depend on specifics of experimental arrangements and inertial
frames. Thus we should not be surprised that if we place a circular polar-
izer placed just beyond the mark, in the rest frame there are (according to
the description) linearly polarized photons impinging on it, whereas in the
moving frame (again according to the description) there are no linearly po-
larized photons anywhere near it. We can base our criterion for objective
mixtures on a previous measurement event, according to the time order in
the given frame. Thus in the rest frame it is the linear polarizer on arm
1 that determines the objective mixtures in the time interval between one
photon having reached its polarizer and its mate the other polarizer, and in
the moving frame it is the circular polarizer on arm 2 . It is also part of
the conventional wisdom that this is a consistent way of proceeding and that
observers in either frame, each one using his own description, will agree as
to their predictions about ultimate physical facts.
Relativity theory forces us to abandon a naive picture of primacy of pure
states and to adopt a sort of hybrid view in which objective mixtures are
ultimate physical facts in some situations and physical descriptions in oth-
ers. In a fixed frame one situation blends into the other without apparent
discontinuity as soon as certain spatio-temporal relations are achieved.
The paradoxical nature of objectifying too much the state description af-
ter measurement in relativistic theories was also pointed out by Mielnik [25]
who concludes that state-reduction and relativity are mutually inconsistent.
This is a surprising conclusion as relativistic quantum field theory is highly
successful. He is led to this by however by tacitly admitting results of coun-
terfactual experiments. Applied to the singlet two-photon state considered
above, his reasoning would lead to the same hidden-variable theory that the
counterfactual passage criterion does. Disallowing such counterfactual defi-
niteness blocks the contradiction. A different resolution of Mielnik’s paradox
is given by Finkelstein [26].
Return again to the projection postulate and let A be a self adjoint op-
erator with discrete spectrum and spectral decomposition A =
∑
λPλ. Let
the normalized vector ψ represent the state upon which the observation is
performed, and let ψλ = Pλψ/||Pλψ|| whenever ||Pλψ|| 6= 0. We now write
ρA =o
∑
||Pλψ||
2(ψλ, ·)ψλ to indicate that ρA occurred through a previous
preparation (measurement) in which, had the “beam splitter” viewpoint been
adopted, the ψλ would describe the pure state in each “beam”. Objective
mixtures are then tokens of preparations. Whether such a mixture is actual
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and complies with the passage criterion or descriptive, depends now on some
spatio-temporal situation. In all cases however one has a correlation cri-
terion. If immediately after observing A we perform a test of whether the
resulting state is ψλ (by using the orthogonal projector onto this vector as
the observable), then the test is satisfied if and only if λ occurs (exact corre-
lation). This of course is due to the orthogonality of the ψλ for different λ.
This is not true for any other set of one-dimensional projectors associated to
those outcomes λ for which Pλψ 6= 0. Thus the correlation criterion picks out
a unique convex combination of pure states and so is a legitimate basis for
objective mixtures. Being an operational criterion (at least for ensembles)
it is about as “objective” as one can wish. It works both in space-like and
time-like situations. Its major disadvantage is that it doesn’t apply to the
state in itself but involves the preparation that produced the state. Such
knowledge of the preparation procedure can be used to separate the beams
again if the original measurement was not of the beam splitter type. Just
measure A again (or any other observable for which the ψλ are eigenstates)
and adopt the beam splitter attitude.
For future reference, let us examine now what happens when we perform
a second measurement represented by a self-adjoint operator B with discrete
spectrum and spectral decomposition B =
∑
µQµ. We now have (ρA)B =∑
µQµρAQµ =
∑
µλ(QµPλψ, ·)QµPλψ. Now can this be interpreted as an
objective mixture according to the correlation criterion? If by this we mean
that each distinct (unnormalized) final state QµPλψ is uniquely correlated to
a set of outcomes, then yes. If however we want that there be a test for each
final state which passes if and only if that state is produced, or if we want
to “separate the beams” as was done for a single measurement above, then
the distinct final states must be orthogonal. We shall consider the objective
mixture description legitimate in this case. This latter situation is always
realized for any initial state ψ whenever A and B commute.
How should one interpret then the ISC constraints? They must now be
read in the following manner: in any theory for which the objective mixture
criterion is the presence of an adequate previous measurement and for which
such descriptions form a consistent logical system leading to frame indepen-
dent predictions of ultimate physical facts, the results of the references hold.
So reinterpreted, the validity of the works is maintained and they still pro-
vide strong criteria for selecting theories, but these theories are to be chosen
among special types. This is an important insight, as one can now see under
what conditions ISC may not constrain a theory or constrain it less. Thus if
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“state collapse” as a descriptive element, along with ISC, argues strongly for
a linear theory (as is expounded in [19, 2]), theories without this descriptive
element, such as the consistent-histories approach to quantum mechanics,
may possibly be made non-linear without violating ISC. We argue in this
direction in [27, 28] and take up this point later in this paper.
3 Locality and Purity
Since the idea of objective mixtures involves decomposition into pure states,
we must examine the nature of pure states in relativistic quantum mechanics.
There are roughly two approaches to this, via fields (Streater and Wightman
[29]) and via algebras of observables (Haag [8]).
The algebraic approach is closer in spirit to what we are contemplating
here as it introduces algebras of local observables, that is, it associates to
each bounded region O of space-time an algebra A(O) of observables that
correspond to experiments that can be executed in O. In relativistic quan-
tum logic we would be interested in propositions that can be tested in O and
so should in some natural way be related to the algebra A(O). It is how-
ever rather difficult to come across examples of local algebras except through
quantum fields and so we present here one possible construction. Assume for
simplicity that we have a real (uncharged) scalar relativistic Wightman field
Φ. Such a field is an operator-valued distribution in the sense that there
is a fixed dense domain D such for any f ∈ S(R4) there is an essentially
self-adjoint operator Φ(f) on the invariant domain D and such that for all
φ, ψ ∈ D the map f 7→ (φ,Φ(f)ψ) defines a tempered distribution. Consider
now the operators Φ(f) for supp f ⊂ O for some bounded region of space-
time O. Let Ac(O) be the set of bounded operators A such that AD ⊂ D
and which commute on D with all the operators Φ(f) introduce above. De-
fine the von-Neumann algebra A(O) as (Ac(O))′, the commutant of Ac(O).
The algebra A(O) is then taken to be the algebra of observables in O. An
alternative definition would be to take for A(O) the von-Neumann algebra
generated by the bounded functions of the Φ(f), that is by those operators
of the form F (Φ(f)) where F is a real Borel-measurable bounded function on
R. The hermitian projectors in A(O) should then correspond to the testable
proposition in O. Now it is a know fact (Araki [30], Haag [8]) that the
von Neumann algebra A(O) is of type III. This means that it contains no
finite-dimensional projector and in particular no one-dimensional projector.
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One-dimensional projectors are indicator propositions for pure states, that
is if P = (ψ, ·)ψ for a normalized vector ψ, and ρ is a density matrix, then
one has Tr(ρP ) = 1 if and only if ρ = (ψ, ·)ψ. It is these projectors that
must be used to test for pure states, and therefore purity of states is not
a local notion. This is the basic insight that relativistic quantum field the-
ory provides for quantum logic. A consequence of this is that the notion of
objective mixtures becomes a non-local notion, and in particular the corre-
lation criterion, as it involves testing for pure states, is a non-local criterion.
Now if one cannot test for purity by projectors in A(O) for a bounded region
O, it is also highly plausible that one can test for pure states by projectors
in the algebra associated to any time slice: O = {(x, y, z, t)|t1 < t < t2}.
Such an algebra is defined by an appropriate limiting procedure in term of
the algebras associated to bounded regions contained in the time slice. For
free fields any time-slice algebra is just B(H), the full operator algebra of
the physical hilbert space. In general one expects the field to obey, in some
appropriate sense, a hyperbolic differential equation and so the field values
at any point can be determined from their values in a time slice. This would
mean that the time-slice algebra coincides with the algebra associated to all
of space-time, which again should be B(H) for reasonable theories.
Suppose now that we perform a measurement in a bounded space-time
region O upon a pure Heisenberg state represented by a normalized vector
ψ. Consider at a space-like point to O two observers, one for whom, ac-
cording to the time variable in his frame, the measurement is still to happen
and another one for whom the measurement has already taken place. As
they fly by each other they exchange notes, each one indicating what the
quantum state is. One says it’s pure, the other one mixed. This apparent
contradiction disappears when one realizes that an operational definition of
purity is not local. Each one’s assessment depends on a time-slice which
for one is prior to the experiment and posterior for the other. Thus in rel-
ativistic quantum mechanics, in the presence of measurements, whether a
state is pure or not is frame dependent. If both observers are however in
the future light cone of all points of O, then their assessments of the state
agree, both will say it is mixed and their respective descriptions should dif-
fer merely by the action of a representation of the Lorentz group, that is
by usual Lorentz covariance. There is a point of consistency here: in the
region where the observers do not agree, no local observable should be able
to distinguish between the two conflicting descriptions. This in fact is the
case, for let the experiment be represented by a self-adjoint operator A with
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discrete spectral decomposition A =
∑
λPλ and let B be a self-adjoint oper-
ator pertaining to a space-like separated local algebra. Let us say the first
observer’s description is that B is being observed on ψ. The expected value
then would be (ψ,Bψ). Assuming normal Lorentz covariance, the second ob-
server describes the situation as observing U(g)∗BU(g) upon U(g)∗ρAU(g)
where U(g) is a unitary operator representing the element g of the Lorentz
group that connects the two observers. This last description gives a mean
value of Tr(U(g)∗BU(g)U(g)∗ρAU(g)) = Tr(BρA) = Tr(B
∑
PλPψPλ) where
Pψ = (ψ, ·)ψ. By the linearity and permutation symmetry of the trace this
is
∑
Tr(PλBPλPψ). Now in all relativistic field theories, local observables in
space-like separated regions commute, so one has PλBPλ = P
2
λB = PλB and
since
∑
Pλ = I, the expected value is Tr(BPψ) = (ψ,Bψ) exactly as for the
first observer. Hence the discrepancy in description of purity of states, due
to the non-local nature of the correlation criterion, has no effect on locally
observable quantities and this is precisely what accounts for the consistency
of this criterion.
We are now in position to abstract from the above situation in conven-
tional quantum mechanics and introduce a sketch of an axiom system for a
measurement theory in relativistic quantum logic.
4 Propositions, Properties, States, and En-
sembles
The basic ingredient of a “quantum logic” approach to a physical theory is a
pair (L,S) where L is an orthomodular poset (usually a lattice) of physical
propositions , and S an abstract convex set whose elements correspond to
physical states . The set P of extreme points of S correspond to pure states .
The relation between L and S is usually that elements of S are σ-additive
probability measures on L, and given s ∈ S and a ∈ L the number s(a)
corresponds to the probability that the proposition a be true in the state s.
We shall not necessarily adhere to such a view though much of the literature
adopts it. We shall not here go into details about how one operationally
prepares pure states nor determines their purity except in so far as is needed
to consider the space-time relations involved.
One generally sees two concepts of physical state that. The most common
one is that of an instantaneous state , and a physical system is supposed to
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at each time instant be in some instantaneous state. The other notion is that
of a state sub specie aeternitatis in which case the whole temporal history
from t = −∞ to t = +∞ is subsumed in the notion. Of course this is an
idealization as normally a state is prepared at some instant and destroyed
at some future instant both by processes foreign to its “normal” isolated
temporal evolution. Thus to maintain a view sub specie aeternitatis one has
to rely on some deterministic evolution extendible to both temporal infinities.
This also means that the states is considered as a self-subsisting entity. The
ability to extend its evolution to a time prior to its creation, means that
it could have been created at a different time and so it has no knowledge
of its creation, and the ability to extend its evolution to a time beyond its
destruction means that it has no presage of its demise. Such a physical
state is an ontological entity all to itself. The two views coexist in ordinary
quantum mechanics whereby the instantaneous state view is maintained in
the Schro¨dinger picture and the other in the Heisenberg picture. The sub
specie aeternitatis view is more convenient for space-time description as the
notion of instantaneous state, even for normal time evolution, brings in frame-
related considerations due to the frame-dependent nature of the notion of
“instant”. Thus we maintain the sub specie aeternitatis viewpoint in this
paper. Of course even this view cannot entirely avoid frame-related notions
as this type of state is allowed to undergo change through the measurement
process or other external interventions. Such changes are generally held to be
instantaneous in some frame and so if the state is conceived as having a space-
time extent, a frame dependent change of description is involved. We shall in
fact be interested in states having sufficiently large space-time extents to be
able to perform independent measurements at spatially separated distances.
Just as in quantum mechanics, we shall assume the notion of ensembles at
least in so far as they can be partially realized by repetitions of preparation
procedures. The notions of subensemble and subensemble fraction is also
maintained. Ensembles are represented by elements of S and we admit,
just as in quantum mechanics, that the same element of S could very well
represent many ontologically distinct ensembles so one should not conflate
the two.
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5 Measurements and Objective Mixtures
We shall assume at least that L and S are related through measurement. By
an instrument I we shall mean an exhaustive n-tuple (a1, . . . , an) ∈ L
n of
mutually exclusive propositions; that is, ai ⊥ aj for i 6= j and
∨n
i=1 ai = 1.
We shall assume that such n-tuples correspond to physical measurements
with n mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes; that is, when such a
measurement procedure is executed, one and only one of the outcomes occurs.
We shall now make a series of assumptions concerning the act of measurement
and discuss them later.
Postulate 1 (M1 – Frequency) Given an instrument I = (a1, . . . , an) and
a state s, then associated to an ensemble of measurements of I in s, is a fre-
quency function ωIi (s) where ω
I
i (s) ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 ω
I
i (s) = 1.
We’ve used the term “frequency function” as a neutral alternative to “prob-
ability” or “propensity” as there is no need to enter into interpretational
questions at this moment. Of course, the subensembles of measurements
corresponding to the occurrences of distinct ai do not overlap.
Postulate 2 (M2 – State transformation) A state subject to a measure-
ment undergoes a transformation to another state representable by an element
of S. Let πI : S → S be the map representing this transformation.
We are adopting here what in the quantum mechanical case we called the
“incoherent mixture” view of measurement.
Postulate 3 (M3 – Subensemble) Given a state s the transformed state
πIs consists of subensembles corresponding to each particular outcome of the
measurement. Each such subensemble is a fraction of the total ensemble
given by the frequency function. Thus there are partial maps πIi such that
πIs =
∑n
i=1 ω
I
i (s)π
I
i s. The expression π
I
i s is considered to be defined only
when ωIi (s) 6= 0.
This assumption allows us now to also adopt the “beam splitter” view of
measurements.
Postulate 4 (M4 – Ideality) Measurements are ideal, in the sense that
for any pure state p and any instrument I one has that πIi p is also pure,
when defined.
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Postulate 5 (M5 – Objectivity) The ensemble produced by a measure-
ment is an objective mixtures of the subensembles corresponding to the indi-
vidual outcomes. That is, πIs =o
∑n
i=1 ω
I
i (s)π
I
i s.
In particular, if one performs a measurement on a pure state, then by M4
and M5 one obtains an objective mixture of pure states.
We leave open as to what exactly is the criterion for objective mixtures.
The precise nature of this criterion is not as relevant as some of its desirable
properties to which we shall draw attention in due time. We mention, for the
sake of concreteness, a possible correlation-type criterion just as in quantum
mechanics:
(Correlation Criterion of Objectivity) The criterion for an ob-
server in the coordinate future to the measurement by an instru-
ment I on a state s to maintain πIs =o
∑n
i=1 αisi with αi 6= 0
is the availability of dicotomic instruments J (j) = (b
(j)
1 , b
(j)
2 ) such
that ωJ
(j)
1 (π
I
i (s)) = δij, and a strict correlation of the first out-
come of J (j) with the j-th outcome of I, in which case αi = ω
I
i (s)
and si = π
I
i (s).
This criterion would suffice for what follows but others could probably do
just as well.
One consequence of assuming the existence of objective mixtures is that
if s =o
∫
p dµ(p) then ωIi (s) =
∫
ωIi (p) dµ(p) and so it’s enough to know the
frequency function only in pure states, and we can assume the functions ωIi
are affine. The same goes for the map πI .
How plausible are these assumptions? Taken together they express our
ability to individuate physical system by appropriate “filtering” through mea-
surements and then to perform statistical experiments on situations so cre-
ated. This constitutes the basis of normal physical experimental practice,
so to negate this is to radically change our view of the statistical nature of
physical phenomena and our experimental access to them. Of course these
assumptions are already idealized, and one could argue with the details of
each one individually, but some such set must be postulated to even begin
a formulation of a statistical science. Part of the above assumptions incor-
porate the notion of self-subsisting physical states, that is the sub specie
aeternitatis view. This is not a logically necessary ingredient of a physical
theory, ingrained as it may be. All a physical theory must be able to do is
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predict the joint probabilities of events, and the mediation of these by phys-
ical states under evolution is not a necessity. As was mentioned before, the
consistent histories approach does not make use of such a notion, and the
preceding assumptions would have to be modified if one were to axiomatize
such a viewpoint.
6 Space-time Structure of Measurements
The relation between a physical theory (L,S) and space-time structure gener-
ally comes in through external considerations. Ordinary hilbert-space quan-
tum mechanics admits both Galileian and Lorentz covariance; such consid-
erations only enter through unitary representations of an appropriate group
and have no expression in the fundamental formalism as such. In our context
we cannot do much better while some basic mathematical questions have yet
to be settled. We assume lorentzian space-time, and in relation to the phys-
ical theory we assume a series of postulates generalizing some of the usual
external connections already seen in hilbert-space theory.
Postulate 6 (S1 – Localization) Given a bounded space-time region O
then there is a sub-orthomodular-poset L(O) ⊂ L corresponding to propo-
sitions testable in O.
This assumption reflects the notion that experiments are essentially bounded
in space-time. Usually one also feels that propositions referring to unbounded
regions should only be admitted as idealizations, that is, limits of local ones.
Thus one could postulate that the union of the subsets L(O) is join-dense
in L which is then viewed as a set of “quasi-local” propositions. Quantum
field theory teaches us that one should not assume about L(O) properties
that one usually postulates about L; thus while the latter is often taken to
be atomic and atomistic, this should not be the case for the local posets.
We say an instrument I = (a1, . . . , an) belongs to a region O if ai ∈ L(O)
for each i. For two regions O1,O2 we write O1 ⊲⊳ O2 in case they are space-
like separated, that is, every point of one is space-like to every point of the
other. For a1, a2 ∈ L we write a1 ⊲⊳ a2 in case a1 ∈ L(O1) and a2 ∈ L(O2)
for some regions O1 ⊲⊳ O2. For two instruments I and J we write I ⊲⊳ J in
case they belong to space-like separated regions.
Postulate 7 (S2 – Locality) If O1 ⊲⊳ O2 then every element of L(O1)
commutes with every element of L(O2).
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It is customary in the lattice-theoretic approach to equate commutativity of
propositions with their commensurability. It is likewise customary to assume
that space-like separated regions are causally disjoint (locality or causality
assumption). This then is a major assumption relating space-time struc-
ture and the poset of proposition. We shall write a ↔ b whenever a and
b commute. It is interesting to mention that in Mittelstaedt’s [3] scheme,
commutativity of space-like separated propositions is necessary for logical
consistency.
If I = (a1, . . . , an) and J = (b1, . . . , bm), are two instruments such that
ai ↔ bj for all i and j, in particular if I ⊲⊳ J , then we can form a new
instrument I ∧ J = (ai ∧ bj)i=1,...,n;j=1,...,m
Now the execution of an experiment consists of physical acts leading to
physical results. This in itself has nothing to do with our description of the
experiment nor consequently with the adoption of any particular reference
frame for space-time. The propositions being tested however do have some-
thing to do with reference frames. If an observer finds at time t0 that a
proposition a is true about a state s, then the truth of a is aspatial, hence
to be considered as such at all points of space. If, as is customary, one con-
siders that a proposition can become true at a time instant t0 then it must
become true instantly and simultaneously at all space points. An observer in
a different frame has a different plane of simultaneity so his propositions be-
come true in a different manner. This frame dependence of truth values and
becoming-true is not necessarily in conflict with a frame-independent physics.
The mutual consistency of the two however, given other requirements, can
and does lead to constraints on physical theories.
Postulate 8 (S3 – Measurement instant) If an experiment correspond-
ing to an instrument belonging to a region O has been executed, then every
observer assigns a unique time instant at which the experiment is considered
to be realized and at which instant one of the propositions related to the in-
strument becomes true and the others false. The plane of simultaneity of this
instant intersects O.
This assumption seems to be generally, even if grudgingly, accepted. The
experimenter often doesn’t have control over the instant in question which is
somehow decided by the physical processes that the experiment unleashes,
yet such an instant is generally identified. Even more often the case is that
the realization of the experiment is associated to some unique event (counter
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click, for instance) and the instant is just the time coordinate of this event in
the given frame. In this case different observers can agree on the same event,
which lies in O. There are of course important apparent exceptions to the
single event viewpoint such as coincidence experiments, but even in this case
some maintain that the experiment is only over when all the information is
gathered in some single recording device, such as a brain, in which case one
falls back on the single event hypothesis. We shall not however adhere to
this viewpoint.
Consider now two experiments executed in space-like separated regions.
Let I = (a1, . . . , an) and J = (b1, . . . , bm) be the corresponding instruments.
Suppose that an observer assigns the same time instant t0 to the realization
of both experiments. Then, by the commensurability of the two instruments,
at t0 the observer maintains not only that one of the ai becomes true and
that one of the bj becomes true but also that one of the ai ∧ bj becomes true.
As far as the observer is concerned, the two separate realizations of I and J is
indistinguishable from a single realization of I ∧ J . This indistinguishability
is our next assumption.
Postulate 9 (S4 – Confluence of simultaneous measurements) If an
observer assigns the same time instant to the realization of two space-like sep-
arated experiments, these can be treated equivalently as the realization of a
single experiment whose outcomes are the conjunctions of the outcomes of
the separate experiments.
Another observer in a different frame would generally see a time interval
between the two realizations, either I first, followed by J , or vice-versa. In
this case he must consider the two experiments as consecutive and for him the
becoming-true of propositions related to the two experiments do not occur
simultaneously. If physics is frame-independent then the two observers must
agree about ultimate physical facts. For this to be the case, the pair (L,S)
must satisfy certain constraints.
What we still lack are assumptions that express the supposed frame in-
dependence of ultimate physical facts. Just as in hilbert-space theory, we
introduce this via group action.
Postulate 10 (C – Lorentz covariance) Let G be the Poincare´ Group.
There are actions (g, a) 7→ λga of G on L and (g, s) 7→ σgs on S such that:
1. For all g ∈ G, λg is an orthomodular-poset isomorphism.
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2. λgL(O) ⊂ L(g(O))
3. For all g ∈ G, the action s 7→ σgs is affine and σg(P) ⊂ P.
4. Given an instrument I = (a1, . . . , an), let λgI = (λga1, . . . , λgan). One
then has:
ωIi (s) = ω
λgI
i (σgs)
π
λgI
i σgp = σgπ
I
i p
For simplicity’s sake we shall write g · a and g · s instead of λga and σgs.
Most of this assumption is a fairly straightforward rendition of rather
standard covariance conditions on physical theories. There are two ways of
understanding the group action. The first, or “passive” view, is that if an
observer describes an experimental procedure as that of executing I upon
state s, then another observer whose frame is obtained from that of the first
one by action of g will describe the same procedure as that of executing g−1 ·I
upon g−1 ·s. The “active” view states that there is another procedure (whose
execution has a clear operational relation to the execution of the first one)
described by g · I and g · s by the first observer and whose description by
the second observer is by I and s. The equivalence of the two views is the
essence of relativistic theories.
One possible strengthening of C3 would be to assert that objective mix-
tures map to objective mixtures, that is, if s =o
∫
p dµ(p), then g · s =o∫
g · p dµ(p). This is prima facie a natural assumption, and we shall formu-
late a version of it. However we shall also need a more subtle manifestation of
covariance in relation to objective mixtures. Since our only assumption con-
cerning objective mixtures is that they come about through measurements
and since the corresponding “collapse” is frame dependent, covariance of ob-
jective mixtures is a rather more involved concept since whatever criterion
for objective mixtures one may adopt, one should not think of it as a local
criterion as the quantum field theory case teaches us. One must imagine that
such a criterion would utilize something like a time-slice region, idealized say
to a space-like hyperplane. In some regions two observers would disagree
even as to which (if any) of the relevant experiments have been carried out
and in which order, leading to objective mixtures not related by the action
of the Poincare´ group. Objective mixtures as observer related descriptions
would have varying relation to physical facts. Thus the simple relation for
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objective mixtures given in the beginning of this paragraph can be main-
tained as referring to the sate in question only by a pair of observers that are
both in the future light cone of all the relevant measurement processes that
enter into the objective mixture criterion.
Postulate 11 (O I – Covariance of objectivity I) If s =o
∫
p dµ(p), then
g ·s =o
∫
g ·p dµ(p). The right hand side of these equations refers to the state
in question as seen by two observers related by the element g of the Poincare´
group provided both are in the time-like future of all events involved in the
objective mixture criterion.
Let now I = (a1, . . . , an) and J = (b1, . . . , bm) be two instruments and
assume I ⊲⊳ J . Consider now an observer, call him Observer 1, who assigns
the same time instant to the realization of both experiments upon a pure state
p (note well: we do not mean that each experiment acts on its own “copy” of
p but each on the same spatially extended state p). According to S4 we can
view this as a realization of I ∧ J and so by the measurement assumptions
the state is transformed into s =o
∑
i,j ω
I∧J
i,j (p)π
I∧J
i,j p. Another observer, call
her Observer 2, will describe the situation as the realization of g · I upon
g · p followed by a realization of g · J upon the resulting state of the first
measurement. The first experiment produces a state s1 =o
∑
i ω
g·I
i (g·p)π
g·I
i g·p
and this is transformed by the second experiment into (note the lack of the
objective equality sign) s2 =
∑
j,i ω
g·J
j (π
g·I
i g · p)ω
g·I
i (g · p)π
g·J
j π
g·I
i g · p. Our
next assumption is that this is in fact an objective mixture:
Postulate 12 (O II – Covariance of objectivity II)
a) s2 =o
∑
j,i ω
g·J
j (π
g·I
i g · p)ω
g·I
i (g · p)π
g·J
j π
g·I
i g · p.
b) s2 = g · s.
This is a subtle point. One has no grounds on the basis of previous
assumptions or analyses to claim that the expression for s2 is an objective
mixture and in fact one needs an additional argument to adopt this hypoth-
esis (it is true that M5 implies that s2 is an objective mixture of certain
non-extreme states, but this is not what we are saying here, and M5 does
not imply O II). One saw in the quantum mechanical discussion that two
successive measurements with commuting instruments lead to an objective
mixture of the type expressed by s2 according to the correlation criterion.
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One could be tempted to use this as guideline and adopt a similar hypothesis
in the quantum logic case, seeing that space-like separated instruments com-
mute. This however has no more compelling reason to be than the covering
law itself and we do not view O II as a statement about commutativity but
about covariance. As has been pointed out, observers in different frames may
even sustain objective mixture descriptions not related by the action of an
element of the Poincare´ group. Such disagreements as to the description of
the state, objective as they may be, should of course not be detectable by
local observations just as in the quantum field theory case, and this leads to
definite constraints on the theory, but these as we shall see will be automati-
cally satisfied. Let us however concentrate on the set of points that are future
time-like to all events involved in the measurement process. As we found out
in the quantum mechanical case, in this region, the passage criterion for ob-
jective mixtures can be maintained and actually carried out as we can have
knowledge of the measurement results. This means that we can actually use
the “beam-splitter” view of measurements and consider conditioning further
measurements to the outcomes of the past measurements I and J . Now if
we condition to outcome ai and bj , then these outcomes are ultimate facts
whether they are simultaneous or not. In the future region we expect, by
the very notion of Lorentz covariance, that the state defined by this “beam”
should behave in a purely covariant fashion, that is, obeying C, when tested
by local observables. As we move further and further into the future, local
observables in this region can have increasingly greater space-like extent and
asymptotically can approach time-slice observables. As these are presumed
to be involved in the objective mixture criterion, these are then also subject
to C. In particular, if Observer 1 finds the state to be sij and if Observer 2
is related to Observer 1 by and element g of the Poincare´ group, she should
find the state to be g−1 · sij. Thus we can argue that the given representa-
tion for s2 should be an objective mixture purely on the grounds of Lorentz
covariance. We should also have s2 = g · s. This type of covariance is if
course somewhat different from the one expressed in C as that one makes no
reference to measurements. Observer 1 has a different geometrical relation
to the measurements than Observer 2 as in his situation there is only one
plane of simultaneity related to the measurements, whereas for her there are
two. The geometrical structures are not group transforms of each other. The
frame-dependent description of the measurement process is in contrast with
the conventional covariance behavior expressed by C. It is thus not surprising
that a full expression of covariance should include statements concerning the
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measurement process, and O II is such a statement. Another way to motivate
this assumptions is to argue that any measurement process, occurring as it
does in an interaction of a system with a macroscopic apparatus, is already
likely to involve space-like separated events. Thus any physically reasonable
system obeying C already must presuppose something like O II.
From s2 = g · s and Postulates 10 and 11, one has the following equality
of objective mixtures:
∑
i,j
ωI∧Ji,j (p)π
I∧J
i,j p =
∑
j
∑
i
ωJj (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p)π
J
j π
I
i p,
and thus, the final pure components and the corresponding fractions must co-
incide. Assuming that the set of pure states is sufficiently large to distinguish
the functions ω and π one comes to the following consequence:
Theorem 1 Given that I ⊲⊳ J where I = (a1, . . . , an) and J = (b1, . . . , bm)
then:
∀p ∈ P, ωI∧Ji,j (p) = ω
J
j (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p) (1)
πI∧Ji,j = π
J
j π
I
i . (2)
These then are the constraints that any measurement theory of the type
described here must satisfy if it is to be able to describe Lorentz-covariant
physics.
One should note that in the two equations of the theorem, the left-hand
side is the same if I and J are interchanged. This leads immediately therefore
to the following relations:
∀p ∈ P, ωJj (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p) = ω
I
i (π
J
j p)ω
J
j (p), (3)
πJj π
I
i = π
I
i π
J
j . (4)
These relations of course could have been independently derived from an
argument similar to ours if we considered two frames in which the temporal
order of experiments I and J are opposite, without considering a frame in
which they are simultaneous.
Now we come to the covering law. What is remarkable is that in various
axiomatic schemes that have been proposed to replace the covering law with
more “physical” assumptions, these coincide with or are readily deduced
from one or both of equations (1–2) or even the weaker results (3–4), with
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the difference that they are postulated for I ↔ J and not only for I ⊲⊳ J . We
have been somewhat more general in this exposition than what is normally
assumed, as usually the ωIi (p) and π
I
i p are postulated not to depend on I but
only on the proposition ai in question. This is the absence of certain type of
contextuality.
Bearing this in mind we thus see that the “Compatibility Postulate” in
Guz [31] is a direct consequence of (2) stated for commuting pairs; axiom
F4 in Guz [32] follows from (1), again stated for commuting pairs, as can be
found in Svetlichny [2]. Pool’s [33, 34] derivation of the semimodularity of
quantum logic, necessary for a hilbert-space interpretation, follows a differ-
ent chain of reasoning but is clearly related to our results. The axioms of
the first paper lead to the equivalence of commutativity of propositions with
a form of equation (4) while in the second paper semimodularity is derived
from a further assumption which in our scheme is M4. Nicolas Gisin (private
communications) has likewise derived the covering law from a form of equa-
tion (1) stated for propensities and has independently postulated a possible
relation between the covering law and space-time structure.
Let us now consider the constraints that express the fact that local ob-
servables must not distinguish between two objective mixtures not related
by an element of the group action but that are legitimately maintained by
two observers who disagree as to which experiments have already been car-
ried out. Suppose that in some region O an experiment is performed which
the first observer, space-like to O, says has already happened and consisted
of an observation by an instrument I upon a pure state p. He would say
the new state is
∑
i ω
I
i (p)π
I
i p. Another observer flying past him would claim
that since the experiment has not been performed in his frame, the state is
g · p where g is the element of the Lorentz group that relates the two ob-
servers. Suppose now that a local experiment is performed in a region O′
space-like to O. The first observer describes this by an instrument J and
the frequency of the j-th result is thus given by
∑
i ω
I
i (p)ω
J
j (π
I
i p). This by
(3) is
∑
i ω
I
i (π
J
j p)ω
J
j (p) = ω
J
j (p). The second observer will assign frequency
ωg·Jj (g · p) to the same result but this by C is also ω
J
j (p) and so the two ob-
servers will agree as to the frequencies of outcomes of local experiments and
the two descriptions are consistent just as in the quantum mechanical case.
Finally we mention that (1) also implies that no superluminal signal can be
sent through long-range correlation by mere change of a local measuring de-
vice. The frequency assigned to the i-th result of instrument I, under lack of
28
knowledge of the outcome of instrument J , is by the right-hand side of (1)
just
∑
j ω
J
j (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p) = ω
I
i (p) which is independent of instrument J just as
in the quantum-mechanical case and so no signal of this type is possible.
7 Bridging the Light Cone
One sees that in some of the existing schemes the crucial axiom that leads to
the covering law can be substituted by Lorentz covariance and an appeal to
a principle generalizing necessary conditions on space-like separated propo-
sitions to merely commuting ones. Let us first examine the purely logical
nature of such a principle which can be stated as follows:
(E – Equivalence of commutativities) Let Q(a, b) be two-place
predicate concerning L then,
(a ⊲⊳ b⇒ Q(a, b))⇒ (a↔ b⇒ Q(a, b))
Assuming the metatheoretic principle E, the covering law can be deduced
from Lorentz covariance and axioms of generally less controversial nature.
The covering law would thus be compelling if one can turn E compelling.
One has to be a bit careful though about this principle, one should proba-
bly not maintain it for all possible Q. If for Q(a, b) we take a ⊲⊳ b then we
deduce (a ↔ b) ⇔ (a ⊲⊳ b) which is likely too strong. It may be that all
commutativity in physics can be reduced to space-like commutativity, but
one should see this in detail and not through a metatheoretic principle. Is
there reason to believe E? One way that E could be true is if there is a sym-
metry group on L by which if a and b are local and a ↔ b then there is an
element φ of this group such that φ(a) ⊲⊳ φ(b). This would establish E for
group invariant predicates and a join-dense set of propositions, which would
probably be sufficient. In ordinary quantum mechanics the full unitary group
of hilbert space is apparently such a symmetry group. There seems to be no
compelling reason however to believe in such a group. Given a complete lack
of any mathematical development of lattice-theoretic approaches “localized”
into space-time regions and with Poincare´ group action, “local relativistic
quantum logic” in other words, it’s even hard to say how restrictive E is.
From the physical side one lacks any real understanding of commutativity of
propositions except for space-like separated ones where causality arguments
seem compelling. Thus the spin and orbital angular momenta of a particle
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commute, but we see this in a purely formal way: the corresponding opera-
tors act on different tensor factors. We cannot say we have a true physical
understanding of this. Without this understanding, the covering law is still
not compelled.
To better understand what can be physically involved in assumptions such
as E, it is necessary to examine more closely the meaning of commutativity,
which formalizes the notion of compatibility. For the rest of this paragraph
we assume a more primitive notion of an instrument than that used in the
previous section. An instrument I corresponds to some procedure or physical
construct which leads to a finite set of outcomes x1, . . . , xn but we do not as-
sume that these are necessarily represented by some algebraic elements. We
can still talk about states p, frequencies ωIi (p) and projections π
I
i p as before.
Operationally, we say that an instruments I with outcome set x1, . . . , xn and
another one J with outcome set y1, . . . , ym are compatible if there is a com-
pound instrument K with outcome set (xi, yj), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m
whose outcome frequencies in any state has as marginals the outcome fre-
quencies of I and J in the same state. The actual physical construction
of K may have in general no clear relation to the physical constructions of
I and J , but in certain cases it is customary to consider K as just I and
J physically coexisting and consider the outcomes of K as coincidences of
outcomes of I and J . This is the case when I ⊲⊳ J and also when I and
J belong to limited space-time regions in which all points of one are fu-
ture time-like to all points of the other. In ordinary quantum mechanics,
the compound observation of compatible observations that succeed tempo-
rally are taken to be just these successive individual measurements. Two
instruments that satisfy (1) for both orders of I and J on the right hand
side are compatible for then the compound instrument K is I ∧ J . In-
deed one has for the two marginals:
∑
j ω
I∧J
i,j (p) =
∑
j ω
J
j (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p) = ω
I
i (p)
and
∑
i ω
I∧J
i,j (p) =
∑
i ω
I
i (π
J
j p)ω
J
j (p) = ω
J
j (p). For space-like separated in-
struments one can argue for both orders on the right-hand side of (1) from
covariance arguments as there are frames in which the measurements occur
in either temporal order. In the time-like case one cannot use this argu-
ment. Let us consider the case in which J belongs to a space-time region all
points of which are future time-like in relation to each point of the region
to which I belongs. One can then consider the instrument J ◦ I consisting
of the successive measurements by I and then by J . By our postulates one
has immediately ωJ◦Ii,j (p) = ω
J
j (π
I
i p)ω
I
i (p) and so (1) holds for one order by
definition even if J and I are not compatible. Now if I and J are compati-
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ble, then conventional wisdom deems J ◦ I to be the compound instrument
K, and so half of (1) is trivially true. The difficulty then is in arguing for
the other half, that is, ωJ◦Ii,j (p) = ω
I
i (π
J
j p)ω
J
j (p). The operational verification
of this cannot now be simply done by successive measurements as the right
hand side now has an I measurement on a state conditioned by a future time-
like J measurement. The frequencies ωJj (p) can be established just from J
measurements, but then to verify the frequencies ωIi (π
J
j p) one needs to be
able to create states πJj p prior to the execution of I, that is one needs an
instrument L with m outcomes, belongs to a region in the temporal past of I,
whether time-like or space-like, and a state p′ such that πLj p
′ = πJj p. One can
then verify (1). Thus the operational verification that this equation holds for
generally commutative instruments involves an assumption concerning the
producibility of given states by actions in distinct and possibly widely sep-
arated regions and so transcends purely covariant considerations. It seems
that to be able to perform the generalization mentioned in the beginning of
this section one needs a physical assumption going beyond covariance.
Standard relativistic quantum theory provides a clue by the presence of
long-range correlated states, that is, states of the EPR type. As a simplified
version of this situation suppose you want to study right-hand circularly
polarized photons. One way is to simply put an appropriate filter in front
of a light source and those photons that get through are of the right kind
and so can be observed at will. Another equivalent way is to set up an EPR-
type arrangement that creates singlet two-photon states with the individual
photons flying off in opposite directions. Put now the same filter on the
distant arm of the EPR apparatus and nothing on the near arm. Observe
at will. Half of the photons observed are right-hand circularly polarized and
half are in the orthogonal left-hand circularly polarized state, and as the
measurements are done, there is no way of knowing which is which. If all one
wants however is analysis of experimental outcomes, this is no problem, just
wait enough time that the results (passage through the filter or not) at the
distant arm of each photon pair are available (typical correlation experiment
situation) and simply throw out all the experimental data for the instances
where the distant photon did not pass through the filter. This provides
you with data now of just the right-hand circularly polarized photons at the
near arm. The fact that these two experimental procedures are equivalent
is a feature of ordinary quantum mechanics and depends on the existence
of a particular entangled state, the two-photon singlet. We now show that
this simplified situation is quite general. Assume we are working with a
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local relativistic quantum field theory of the Haag type in a hilbert space H.
Let I = (P1, . . . , Pn) and J = (Q1, . . . , Qm) be two compatible instruments
belonging to two limited space-time regions, OI and OJ respectively, which
need not be space-like separated. Let Ψ be a pure state. Consider now an
element g of the Poincare´ group such that O′J = g(OJ) is space-like separated
from both the original regions. Let U(g) be the unitary symmetry operator
associated to g, and let J ′ = (Q′1, . . . , Q
′
m), where Q
′
j = U(g)QjU(g)
∗, be the
transformed instrument. One can choose O′J in such a manner [8, 35] that H
decomposes into a tensor productH = H1⊗H2 with Pi = P˜i⊗I, Qj = Q˜j⊗I,
and Q′j = I ⊗ Q˜
′
j . The projectors of all three instruments commute among
themselves. Let Λ be the set of triples ijk such that PiQjQ
′
kH 6= {0}, and for
ijk ∈ Λ let eijkα, α ∈ A(ijk) be an orthonormal basis for PiQjQ
′
kH. One has
Ψ =
∑
ijk∈Λ
∑
α∈A(ijk) ψijkαeijkα. Now for fixed ij one can find an index p such
that ipj ∈ Λ, for otherwise one would have
∑
p PiQpQ
′
j = PiQ
′
j = 0 which is
impossible given the tensor product decomposition. Choose β ∈ A(ipj), set
ψ′ipjβ =
√ ∑
{k | ijk∈Λ}
∑
α∈A(ijk)
|ψijkα|2
and set all other components ψ′ikjα = 0 for (k, α) 6= (p, β). Obviously Ψ
′ =∑
ijk∈Λ
∑
α∈A(ijk) ψ
′
ijkαeijkα is another normalized state vector. One easily
verifies ||PiQ
′
kΨ
′||2 = ||PiQkΨ||
2. In standard quantum mechanics one has
ωIi (Ψ) = ||PiΨ||
2 and πIiΨ = PiΨ/||PiΨ||, whenever ω
I
i (Ψ) 6= 0. We have
from our construction that ωI∧J
′
i,j (Ψ
′) = ωI∧Ji,j (Ψ), ω
J ′
j (π
I
iΨ
′) = ωJj (π
I
iΨ) and
ωIi (Ψ
′) = ωIi (Ψ). So the validity of (1) for the pair of instruments (I, J)
can be deduced from the validity for the pair (I, J ′) of space-like separated
instruments due to the existence of the state Ψ′. Note that no distinction is
made between the two instruments so that the right-hand side of (1) holds
for any order. The validity of (1) for space-like separated instruments follows
basically from Lorentz covariance and other assumptions of this paper and
so is not peculiar to standard quantum theory. The existence of Ψ′ has to
be viewed however as an additional physical assumption, that happens to be
true in standard quantum theory and is in some sense also characteristic of
it. This state is in general one that has long-range correlations of the EPR-
type. We can now envisage a more physically plausible version of principle
E:
Postulate 13 (EP - Equivalence of conditioning) For any pair of in-
struments (I, J) with I ↔ J and pure state p there is an instrument J ′
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such that J ′ ⊲⊳ I, and a pure state p′ such that the joint experiment (I, J)
on the state p is equivalent to the joint experiment (I, J ′) on p′. That is,
ωI∧J
′
i,j (p
′) = ωI∧Ji,j (p), ω
J ′
j (π
I
i p
′) = ωJj (π
I
i p) and ω
I
i (p
′) = ωIi (p)
We call this equivalence of conditioning since it allows one to prepare
states conditioned to outcomes at space-like separations as was the case for
the simplified photon polarization experiment. With this additional postu-
late, as was pointed out before, one can now deduce the covering law in some
of the existing axiomatization schemes.
8 Conclusions
One of the most intriguing features of quantum mechanics is its universality.
All phenomena, to the extent that their quantum behavior can be exhibited
experimentally, are subject to the same general formalism. The postulated
connection of quantum mechanics to space-time structure makes this un-
derstandable. The measurements to which the above discussion refer could
be any measurements. To the extend that any measurement takes place in
space-time, it must exhibit universal quantum behavior. The universality of
quantum mechanics is a reflection of the universality of space-time as the
arena for our experiments.
To be able to deduce such universality one however has to be able to
make some assumption such as EP compelling. Now why should EP be
compelling? It is unlikely that one can find an argument on purely formal
grounds or by appeal to “reasonableness” of any kind just as such appeals
are ultimately unconvincing in all the axiomatic approaches to quantum me-
chanics. Space-like and time-like situations are in logically distinct domains
and any relation between them must come from some realm in which this
distinction is weakened. The only existing considerations of this sort come
from what is loosely known as “quantum gravity”. In fact, at this point
one perceives a fundamental difficulty with the whole argument of this pa-
per. One has started with a definitely classical view of space-time and traced
out a route which leads to a universal mechanics. But now space-time phe-
nomena themselves must, by universality, be subject to the same mechanics,
which distorts the original starting point. Space-time itself must be quantum
mechanical. There is a self-consistency question. The constraints that space-
time structure places on mechanics must govern the structure of space-time
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itself. Unfortunately “quantum-space-time quantum logic” is just a glim-
mer of an idea at this moment, more remote than the “relativistic quantum
logic” that we’ve embarked upon. In any case, in all present-day approaches
to quantum gravity, the rigid structure of the light cone disappears and the
usual notions of space-like and time-like are emergent and not fundamental.
In such a context it is perfectly understandable that relations between space-
like and time-like situations arise out of a more basic theory in which such a
distinction is not fundamental.
On a more technical side, we note that the above argument utilizes more
the lorentzian causal structure of space-time and the relativity of simultane-
ity than the exact details of Lorentz covariance. Thus one can expect that a
similar result can be obtained for curved space-time as well. Strict Lorentz
covariance should therefore be viewed as a simplifying assumption for these
preliminary studies. One also has the awkwardness of deriving a global fea-
ture (covering law) through local considerations. One knows from algebraic
quantum field theory that local von Neumann algebras of observables have a
unique form (Haag [8]), they are all type III1 hyperfinite factors for a causal
diamond O (intersection of a forward and a backward light cone). It would
be more in keeping with the local approach to try to deduce that L(O) is
isomorphic to the projection lattice of a type III1 hyperfinite factor and then
only secondarily argue for the covering law through global considerations.
This of course requires a lattice-theoretic characterization of such factors,
which to our knowledge is not available.
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